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ABSTRACT
In the modern military’s highly interconnected and technology-reliant operational environment, cybersecurity is rapidly growing in importance. Moreover, as a number of highly publicized attacks have occurred against complex cyber- physical systems such as automobiles and airplanes, cybersecurity is no longer 
limited to traditional computer systems and IT networks. While architectural analysis 
approaches are critical to improving cybersecurity, these approaches are often poorly 
understood and applied in ad hoc fashion. This work addresses these gaps by answer- 
ing the questions: 1. “What is cybersecurity architectural analysis?” and 2. “How can 
architectural analysis be used to more effectively support cybersecurity decision making 
for complex cyber-physical systems?” First, a readily understandable description of 
key architectural concepts and definitions is provided which culminates in a working 
definition of “cybersecurity architectural analysis,” since none is available in the liter-
ature. Next, we survey several architectural analysis approaches to provide the reader 
with an understanding of the various approaches being used across government and 
industry. Based on our proposed definition, the previously introduced key concepts, 
and our survey results, we establish desirable characteristics for evaluating cyber- 
security architectural analysis approaches. Lastly, each of the surveyed approaches 
is assessed against the characteristics and areas of future work are identified.
Keywords—cybersecurity; architectural analysis; system architecture; systems 
security engineering; complex system security
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I. INTRODUCTION
The cybersecurity threat is one of the most seri-
ous economic and national challenges we face as a 
nation—economic prosperity in the 21st century 
depends on cyber [1]. Cyberattacks have grown in 
frequency and complexity, and it is now common- 
place to hear of widespread cyberattacks on pers- 
onal computers, webservers, and even large com- 
pany and government personnel databases [2]. More- 
over, as the Internet of Things (IoT) continues to 
grow, the centrality of cyber-physical devices to 
modern life is increasingly important [3]. Previously, 
cyber-physical systems such as automobiles and 
airplanes were relatively simplistic. Astonishingly, 
the 2017 Ford F-150, a relatively common vehi-
cle, has over 150 million lines of code [4], demon-
strating the complexity of modern systems when 
software is at the core of functionality [3]. For 
these cyber-enabled systems, adversaries are 
challenging traditional assumptions that systems 
are secure due to their relative isolation and unique- 
ness. Recent examples include a widely-publicized 
hacking demonstration against a Jeep Cherokee [6]. 
claims of hacking a commercial airliner [7], and 
comprehensive reports of vehicle vulnerabilities [3]. 
In light of this growing threat, it is critical to analy- 
ze modern weapon systems for cybersecurity vul- 
nerabilities as directed by the United States 
Congress to mobilize industry to counter these 
attacks [9]. 
Recent Department of Defense (DoD) policy up-
dates have expanded the traditional IT security ap-
proaches and mandated cybersecurity assessments 
for cyber-enabled weapon systems [9], [10], [11], [12]. 
These revisions dictate that acquisition programs 
integrate cybersecurity efforts into existing sys-
tems engineering processes, and work to ensure 
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cyber considerations hold equal footing with other 
requirements and design trade-offs at major acqui-
sition milestones [13].
For highly complex systems, including DoD weap- 
on systems, architectural analysis is a critical en- 
abler to effective cybersecurity; however, archi- 
tectural analysis approaches are often poorly under-
stood and applied in ad hoc fashion. This work ad-
dresses these gaps by answering the questions:
1. “What is cybersecurity architectural analysis?”
2. “ How can architectural analysis be used to more 
effectively support cybersecurity decision mak-
ing for cyber-physical systems?”
This paper examines and proposes answers to the 
above questions. In Section II, we provide a readily 
understandable discussion of key concepts and def- 
initions. Section III expands on this foundation and 
surveys several cybersecurity architecture analy- 
sis approaches from government and industry. In 
Section IV, desirable characteristics for architec-
tural analysis for cybersecurity are identified and 
mapped to the approaches from Section III. Lastly, 
Section V summarizes key findings and identifies 
promising follow-on research areas for increasing 
the effectiveness of cybersecurity architectural 
analysis of unprecedented systems, specifically 
modern complex cyber physical systems.
II. FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
This section provides a brief historical context 
for system-level architectural analysis and, more 
formally, discusses key definitions for cybersecurity 
architectural analysis. 
A. Brief History of System Architecture
Much of the seminal work in the field of architec-
ture analysis was accomplished by Zachman, who 
proposed the first system architecture—a logical 
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construct for integrating the complexities of mod-
ern information systems [14]. Similarly to the varying 
levels of abstraction in physical construction plans, 
Zachman argued that system architectures should 
be composed of many perspectives in varying levels 
of detail. Moreover, he insisted that these perspec-
tives (or views) be synchronized across the system, 
forming one integrated architecture.
Sowa expanded Zachman’s work to form the In-
formation Systems Architecture (ISA) framework [15]. 
Shown in Fig. 1, the ISA employs six interrogatives 
(what, how, where, who, when, and why) across five 
levels of detail (scope, business, system, technology, 
and detailed representations) as a means of ex- 
pressing relationships to guide complex system 
development [16]. In this way, the ISA offers a simpli-
fied approach to compare and elaborate on the de-
sired capabilities, requirements, components, and 
functions in an integrated enterprise-level model 
which enables effective decision making. Note, not 
all 30 conceptual graphs are required; thus, the 
ISA is also tailorable. Since its inception, the ISA 
(commonly known as the Zachman Framework) has 
been a popular choice for system architects—it has 
been widely used by system architects for decades, 
while several other system-level frameworks have 
incorporated or adopted its tenets [17].
B. Key Definitions
Here we discuss definitions for key terminology 
used in this work (i.e., “cybersecurity,” “architect- 
ure,” and “analysis”). First, the term “cybersecurity” 
should be addressed because it is generally the most 
poorly understood (see sidebar in [16]). Within the 
DoD, cybersecurity is formally defined as:
The prevention of damage to, protection of, and 
restoration of electronic systems to ensure its  
availability, integrity, authentication, confidenti-
ality, and nonrepudiation [19]. 
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Despite being often cited, this definition tends to cause confusion because it is packed 
with domain-specific IT jargon: availability ensures the system is usable as anticipated; 
integrity is the protection from unauthorized modification; confidentiality is keeping 
data private; authentication is a validation of the claimed identity; and, nonrepudiation is 
the ability to prove that an action has taken place. While seemingly comprehensive, the 
DoD definition is somewhat hindered with legacy terminology; a more practical (i.e., a 
working) definition of cybersecurity might simply seek to protect critical systems against 
cyber-based threats [20].
The next key term to define is “architecture” (note, we interpret “architecture” synony-
mously with “system architecture” and/or “system-level architecture”). Perhaps the most 
classically understood definition of architecture is provided by Maier and Rechtin:
Structure in terms of components, connections, and constraints of a product, process, 
or element [21].
This definition offers a holistic view of the system of interest to include technological 
aspects as well as non-technological aspects, such as processes. In the simplest terms, an 
architecture merely provides a means for viewing the system of interest from different 
perspectives. Conversely, in a somewhat physically-driven characterization, ISO/IEC/IEEE 
42010 provides the following definition for architecture:
The fundamental organization of a system, embodied in its components, their relation- 
ship to each other and the environment, and the principles governing its design and 
evolution [22].
Figure 1. The Zachman Framework for Enterprise Architecture [24].
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Somewhat surprisingly, the DoD provides a progressive definition of system architecture:
A set of abstractions (or models) that simplify and communicate complex structures, 
processes, rules, and constraints to improve understanding and implementation [23].
In addition to being readily understandable, this definition alerts the reader to the in-
trinsic value offered by such architectures in that they serve to simplify communication 
with, and improve understanding of, key stakeholders (not just engineers). Moreover, this 
definition implies that architectures are intended to improve the system’s implementation. 
While these value-rich aspects of the definition are a bit atypical, they are useful for help-
ing others to understand what an architecture is and does.
Lastly, the task of identifying a formal definition of “analysis” within the context of 
a “system architecture” proved more difficult than previous definitions. Often a systems 
architecture will center on an integrated model of entities and the relationships between 
them; architectural models serve as a vehicle to bring order, and thus understandability, 
to the growing complexity associated with complex systems. An architecture-focused def- 
inition may read as such:
Architectural analysis is the activity of discovering important system properties using 
conceptual and physical models of the system of interest [25]. 
However, an architecture’s purpose is to increase understanding and facilitate better 
engineering choice [17]. This two-fold purpose is acutely stated by Crawley et al.:
Architectural analysis focuses on understanding both the architecture’s function and 
form to support decision making [26].
It is worth noting the closely related concept of architecture trade-off analysis, which 
focuses on evaluating and comparing alternative architecture-level designs and attributes 
(e.g., modifiability, security, performance, reliability, etc. [27]. 
C. Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis Working Definition
Ultimately, architectural analysis identifies trade-off points among system attributes 
and facilitates communication among stakeholders (e.g., customers, developers, operators, 
maintainers). System-level architectural analysis requires consideration of various mis-
sions, essential functions, potential components, and desirable attributes, which help to 
clarify and refine stakeholder needs and, later, requirements. Moreover, integrated archi-
tectural analysis provides a robust framework for ongoing and concurrent system design 
and analysis.
Specific to the cyber domain, architectural analysis should be used to understand cy-
ber dependencies within the functions and form of the system to enable well-informed 
decisions. This type of structured analysis brings an otherwise unmanageable amount of 
information under control in support of system security requirements [28]. Architectural 
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analysis enables system-level programmatic risk management by providing context and 
functional mapping to the various physical elements of the system. Thus, cybersecurity 
architectural analysis allows appropriate security mitigations to be applied where needed 
with rigorous justification. 
After considering seminal definitions in the area, and working through the various 
architectural analysis approaches discussed in Section III, we present a working definition 
of cybersecurity architectural analysis for consideration: 
The activity of discovering and evaluating the function and form of a system to  
facilitate cybersecurity decisions. [31]
This definition identifies two key activities, discovery and evaluation, while simultane-
ously catering to both new development (i.e., a focus on desired capability through func-
tionality) and legacy systems (i.e., a focus on existing system solutions). For new devel-
opments, discovery typically implies exploring the business or mission problem space to 
further understand the desired capability through functional analysis. For existing sys-
tems, this process is often conducted in reverse, mapping critical subsystems back to criti-
cal functions which support important business operations or mission execution. It is also 
worth noting that cybersecurity architectural analysis should also help with identifying 
and understanding how security requirements support the desired capability, which also 
provides traceability that is often lacking in systems security efforts.
As part of the broader system definition and development effort, cybersecurity architec-
tural analysis should help inform engineering tradeoffs and decision making such as those 
processes and activities described in ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288.
III. CURRENT CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS APPROACHES
In this section, we survey architectural analysis approaches and assess their applicabil-
ity for complex system cybersecurity. Within the DoD (and its major defense contractors), 
several approaches (i.e., methods, processes, and tools) have been developed to secure and 
assess the cybersecurity of complex systems and systems-of-systems. While providing a 
detailed case study for each approach surveyed in this work would be ideal for a robust 
assessment, it is just not feasible as some approaches take months if not years to complete. 
This survey is based on publicly available literature and presentations that focus specifi-
cally on architectural analysis for weapon systems. 
The predecessor for many cybersecurity architectural analysis approaches is compli-
ance-based Information Assurance (IA), which focuses almost exclusively on applying 
security controls to computer networks and IT systems. For complex systems, this ap-
proach is inadequate as demonstrated by several high profile security breaches [29]. This 
inadequacy has driven the development of many of the approaches described in this work.
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A. Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF)
The integrated architecture currently in use by the DoD is the DoD Architecture Frame-
work (DoDAF). Its purpose is to manage complexity to enable key decisions through or- 
ganized information sharing [23]. However, in DoDAF, like many other architecture frame-
works, security (or cybersecurity) is not specifically addressed [30]. James Richards, in his 
work Using the Department of Defense Architecture Framework to Develop Security Re-
quirements [28], proposes a methodology for using DoDAF to derive security requirements. 
He outlines a process of first building an architectural model of the enterprise, focusing 
on a core set of views including the OV-5b operational activity model, the DIV-2 logical 
data model, and the OV-3 operational resource flow matrix. These critical views are used 
to model security-relevant processes, data, business rules, and communications. Next, he 
suggests comparing views for compliance and then assessing and refining the architecture. 
The overall purpose of Richards’ approach is to use DoDAF to expose or derive security 
requirements [28], This approach has not been widely adopted, but his work demonstrates 
utility for complex cyber-physical systems.
B. Unified Architecture Framework (UAF) 
In contrast to the unique solution DoDAF, industry has developed the Unified Archi-
tecture Framework (UAF) [31]. Based on industry need, the UAF includes a formal secu-
rity domain amongst the more common architectural views. The UAF security domain 
includes views for security taxonomy, structure, connectivity, processes, constraints, and 
traceability. More specifically, it uses Systems Modeling Language (SysML) class diagrams 
to identify data types and map them to protections and security controls. As an integrat-
ed architecture, it allows security-relevant elements to be mapped to system resources 
and operations. UAF also capitalizes on the success of model-based sytems engineering 
(MBSE) efforts to depict and analyze the security properties of a simulation oriented 
language (SoI) via an executable architecture. Note, UAF is in the final stages of devel-
opment, so its utility has yet to be fully realized; however, some pathfinder examples of 
proposed security views demonstrate utility for conducting cybersecurity architectural 
analysis of complex cyber-physical systems [32]. 
C. Publically Available Industry Efforts
Major defense contractors often use custom architectural analysis approaches to design 
and evaluate their system architectures concerning cybersecurity. Although it is likely 
that most large DoD contractors are working solutions in this area; at the time of this 
survey, the authors were only exposed to efforts from Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and 
Lockheed Martin. Note, Raytheon’s Cyber Resiliency Architecture Framework (CRAF) was 
the only approach with a detailed open-source publication available. Limited information 
is available on Northrop and Lockheed’s approaches.
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Raytheon developed CRAF using a DoDAF reference architecture with extensions for 
specific cyber resilience mappings and metrics [33]. The goal of CRAF is to assess and iden-
tify gaps in cyber resiliency by mapping systems, subsystems, and components against 
prioritized capabilities to identify resilience requirements for critical mission scenarios. 
Using failure modes and effects analysis, Northrop Grumman created a risk-based as-
sessment methodology using an integrated architecture modeled in the new UAF to identify 
cyber risks for their systems [32]. This approach is still under development and is one of 
the first systems security efforts based on the upcoming UAF standard security views from 
the Object Management Group (OMG).
Lockheed Martin has created a custom solution titled the Secure Engineering Assurance 
Model (SEAM) [34]. SEAM is a tailored systems security engineering approach to integrate 
security into every solution they deliver. This framework provides tailored security consid-
erations and checklists for each program area.
D. Risk Management Framework (RMF) for Cybersecurity
In response to increasing risks against critical infrastructure and information technol-
ogy systems, the US government enacted the Federal Information Security Management 
Act of 2002 which established minimum information security requirements for federal 
information systems, and charged the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) with developing security standards and guidelines to address these growing 
risks [35]. In response to this requirement, NIST created the Risk Management Framework 
(RMF) which provided a structured yet flexible process for applying these standards and 
guidelines [36]. Accordingly, RMF is the mandated approach for addressing cybersecurity 
in the DoD [11]. In general, this approach applies a prescriptive risk-based methodology to 
cybersecurity with the goal of identifying, mitigating, and eliminating system vulnerabili-
ties to protect systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, 
or destruction. Within the U.S. Air Force, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center 
is tasked with conducting RMF for legacy weapon systems (designated as the Platform 
IT (PIT) systems) [37]. This PIT assessment and authorization process consists of six-steps 
described in the next paragraph [13]. 
First, the team must categorize the PIT system according to the information displayed, 
processed, stored, and transmitted along with the classification of the information and as-
sociated technologies. Second, security controls are selected (or assigned) based on the im-
pact resulting from the loss of said information (i.e., criticality analysis) [12]. The third step 
is implementing said controls with consideration for cybersecurity requirements across 
the entire system development life cycle—although security controls have been historically 
applied to IT systems, many have been tailored for PIT systems with prescribed over-
lays [37]. The fourth step is key to the RMF process and assesses the effectiveness of applied 
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security controls through threat mapping and vulnerability analysis. On a related note, 
much of the security work conducted today is exclusively focused on this step. Based on 
the identified vulnerabilities, the fifth step is to produce a risk assessment and mitigation 
plan, which is then briefed to the Authorization Official for authorization. The sixth step 
of the RMF process is continuous monitoring of the system with respect to cybersecurity. 
As the system and threat environment evolve, security control effectiveness needs to be 
continuously assessed while keeping in mind future changes and cybersecurity impact.
The RMF is the mostly widely implement approach of those surveyed as it is mandatory 
for DoD information systems to receive an authorization to operate. While this approach 
has mitigated vulnerabilities, many cite its perceived difficulty, steep learning curve, and 
IT-centric focus as currently implemented as critiques in its utility for complex cyber- 
physical systems.
E.  Avionics Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation (ACVAM) and Cyber 
Hardening Efforts
The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), in conjunction with the Air Force Institute 
of Technology’s (AFIT) Center for Cyberspace Research, developed an Avionics Cyberspace 
Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation (ACVAM) Workshop [38]. This weapon-system- 
specific workshop teaches a thorough analysis approach by systematically identifying and 
assessing all external inputs and communications paths to and from a weapon system 
(i.e., an exhaustive boundary analysis of the system’s architecture). The primary activities 
include gathering information, identifying and analyzing access points, finding and ana-
lyzing susceptibilities, anticipating attacks, and applying and recommending mitigations 
and protections. The ACVAM approach requires extensive subject-matter expert (SME) 
involvement, access to design documents, and detailed operator insight to discover suscep-
tibilities and determine appropriate mitigations to increase mission assurance by eliminat-
ing or reducing vulnerability to cyberattacks. [39]
Additionally, AFRL is developing enhanced cyber hardening tools and resiliency instruc-
tions [40]. While specific details are not publicly available, the cyber hardening approach 
was recently briefed to the defense community at large [39]. In general, this approach de-
scribes avionics cyber hardening and resiliency concepts and suggests ways to protect 
avionics and related systems from cyberattack. Moreover, this approach encourages engi-
neers to ‘think avionics cyber’ using three tenets of cyber protection: focus on what’s criti-
cal; restrict access to the critical; and detect, react, and adapt [41]. These approaches provide 
a robust analysis but require technically savvy domain experts to execute, which restricts 
its utility for a larger group of complex systems.
F. Attack Path Analysis via Automotive Example
Historically, attack path analysis has served the security community well [42]. In a great 
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example from the automotive domain, Checkoway et al., provide a practical attack path 
analysis and comprehensive discussion which solidifies the importance of threat model-
ing as a cybersecurity architectural analysis technique [8]. While this specific example is 
automobile-centric, many similarities are shared between cyber-physical systems. More 
specifically, the work details a four-step method of analyses. First, threat model character-
ization is accomplished through identification of external attack vectors and attack surfac-
es. Second, vulnerability analysis addresses the accessibility, criticality, and exploitability 
of potential vulnerabilities. Third, a threat assessment attempts to gauge the attacker’s 
motivation by answering the question of what utility a given attack path has for the attack-
er. Finally, the approach suggests mitigation actions by synthesizing similarities among 
vulnerabilities to provide practical recommendations for enhancing the system’s cyberse-
curity.
G. System Theory Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec)
In recent work, MIT’s System Theory Process Analysis (STPA) approach for safety was 
extended to focus on security related concerns, known as STPA-Sec [43]. The goal of this ap-
proach is to ensure mission-critical functions are maintained in the face of disruption(s). 
Starting from a strategic viewpoint, system developers and users can proactively shape 
the operational environment by controlling specified mission critical system risks. This 
top-down approach elevates the security problem from guarding the system (or network) 
against all potential attack paths to a higher-level problem of assuring the system’s critical 
functions. The STPA-Sec steps include: identifying unacceptable losses, identifying system 
hazards (vulnerabilities), drawing the system functional control structure, and identifying 
unsafe or insecure CAs [43]. This method has been embraced by defense and commercial 
industries with several favorable case studies [43].
H. Functional Mission Analysis for Cyber (FMA-C)
The DoD has adopted Functional Mission Analysis for Cyber (FMA-C) as an approach to 
secure operational computer networks [45]. FMA-C is being taught to thousands of airmen to 
assure critical cyber systems and reduce vulnerabilities. While the structure and content 
of FMA-C are similar to STPA-Sec, its application is tailored to As-Is Information Technol-
ogy infrastructures. In practice, Air Force Mission Defense Teams apply FMA-C to fielded 
cyber systems to identify mission-critical vulnerabilities. It has proved to be a useful tool 
for understanding and mitigating risks in traditional cyber (i.e., ICT) domains. 
I. Other Notable Methodologies
As previously noted, other methodologies and frameworks for systems-level security 
analysis are sure to exist which are not covered in this work. A few notable works focused 
on mission assurance are available here [46], [47], [48], and on software here [49], [50].
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IV.  DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS FOR CONDUCTING CYBERSECURITY  
ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS
This section identifies desirable characteristics for cybersecurity architectural analysis 
and cross-examines the approaches discussed in Section III.  
A. Cybersecurity Architectural Analysis Characteristics
The first characteristic is definitional and classifies approaches as either top down or 
bottom up. Those defined as top down start with analysis at the function level with iden-
tification and examination of critical missions and/or capabilities—sometimes operations 
depending on how the approach is being applied. As is typical of architecting for new sys-
tems (and sometimes upgrades), higher-level functional analysis leads to further function-
al decomposition and allocation to a more specific form (e.g., lower subsystems, elements, 
or components). These approaches lend themselves to the identification of stakeholder se-
curity needs, early trade-offs, thorough security requirements definition, and integration 
of more holistic security solutions [27]. 
Conversely, bottom-up approaches begin with the form in mind (i.e., the physical or 
technological solution) and often focus on perimeter security through boundary analy-
sis [51]. While this approach successfully identifies vulnerabilities in networked compo-
nents, it is often less useful for protecting systems from intelligent adversaries. For exam-
ple, Bayuk and Horowitz [52] surmise that perimeter defense tactics are mostly ineffective, 
and conclude that a top-down, risk-based systems engineering approach to system security 
should be used instead.
The next key characteristic is whether the approach should be driven by threats or 
vulnerabilities. Prior research suggests that the foundation for improving system security 
starts with an analysis of potential threats, which leads to more appropriate security 
requirements for implementation [42]. This is intuitive; without first understanding the 
adversary—system-specific threats (and their rapid agility)—it is difficult, or impossible, to 
defend against them. Understanding and modeling the threat becomes a critical prerequi-
site for generating and developing secure systems [53]. Once the model has been developed 
and validated, vulnerability analysis is the logical follow-on. With the threats understood, 
the system architecture can be analyzed for vulnerable access points through techniques 
such as attack path analysis and/or red teaming. 
While acknowledging the rapidly changing nature of threats, the exercise of red teaming 
and brainstorming potential attack paths is a helpful critical thinking exercise for ensur-
ing sound cybersecurity practices. Moreover, threat modeling and vulnerability analysis 
typically form the foundation for cybersecurity architectural analysis. While threat model-
ing alone does not ensure cybersecurity, rigorous threat modeling and vulnerability anal-
ysis are helpful for ensuring the security of realized systems. However, more focus should 
be applied to providing security solutions and not just focused on identifying problems.
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In today’s highly-contested cyberspace environment, documentation-based engineering 
is largely ineffective against dynamic adversaries [42]. Developing a successful response to 
a dynamic adversary necessitates the tools and methods used to develop countermeasures 
be, in kind, dynamic. In response to these complexities, Model-Based Systems Engineering 
(MBSE) offers an integrated modeling approach capable of mapping desired capabilities 
to functions (and even components), as well as providing traceability and fit-for-purpose 
views to enable more effective decision-making [54]. In a recent effort, Apvrille and Roudier 
proposed SysML-Sec, an injection of security considerations into SysML to foster integra-
tion between system designers and security experts [55]. SysML-Sec and more generally 
MBSE approaches enable security-focused computer simulations of a potential system ar-
chitecture. These executable architectures provide tremendous value by providing insights 
into early design trade-off analysis [56]. While MBSE requires significant initial investment 
in tools and training, it significantly increases the depth of possible architectural analysis, 
especially in executable architectures.
B. Assesment of Architectural Analysis Approaches
Table I provides a consolidated assessment (i.e., a mapping) of the proposed architectural 
analysis characteristics to the surveyed approaches from Section III. This mapping seeks 
to provide a consolidated reference for differentiating approaches to inform the user and 
assist in selecting an appropriate cybersecurity architectural approach which meets the 
stakeholders’ needs. Consideration is given to each approaches’ usability, scalability, and 
tool availability. The ideal approach will also easily facilitate modeling and simulation stud-
ies to perform early design feasibility studies and support trade-off analysis (i.e., MBSE).
In general, bottom-up approaches are relatively systematic; however, historically they 
have not produced secure systems and tended to scale poorly. Top-down approaches have 
the benefit of being more scalable, but they often require a high level of tool proficiency 
to effectively model (thus, the potential of MBSE to systems security is largely missed). 
While vulnerability analysis is inherent in every approach, a threat- based approach is less 
so. This aspect is crucial because effectively safeguarding unprecedented, and complex 
systems require more than a good architectural tool or technique – a holistic engineering 
approach that embraces all aspects of security (e.g., people, processes, policy, technology, 
feasibility, cost, etc.) is required [57], [58].
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The practice of architectural analysis is not new; however, in the context of complex 
cyber-physical systems, the role of architectural analysis with respect to cybersecurity is 
not well understood. Moreover, given cybersecurity’s widespread interest, it was surprising 
to find a general lack of understanding or consistency regarding what it means to conduct 
architectural analysis for cybersecurity while surveying the literature. Thus, this work 
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briefly surveys key architectural analysis concepts and provides a timely and widely 
applicable working definition of “cybersecurity architectural analysis” for the community 
to consider. Next, a survey of several cybersecurity architectural analysis approaches from 
industry and government is provided, along with an assessment of their applicability 
for complex cyber-physical systems according to several desirable characteristics. These 
results help practitioners and researchers understand how to achieve more effective 
cybersecurity architectural analysis efforts to develop secure systems according to stake-
holders needs.   
While there are several promising cybersecurity architectural approaches, each with 
unique aspects to be more fully explored, standardized approaches such as UAF paired 
with MBSE hold promise and have a wider acceptance than some alternatives. In the near 
term, the authors have chosen to explore STPA-Sec to more fully understand its utility as 
Table 1: Architectural Approaches to Characteristics Mapping
Top 
Down
Bottom 
Up
Threat 
Driven
Vul.
Based
MBSE 
Integrated
MBSE
Executable
Tool 
Based
DoDAF+
Richards X1 X X X4 X
CRAF X1 X X X X X
UAF Security X X X X4 X
ACVAM X X X
STPA-Sec X2 X
RMF X5 X X X3
1. Promotes a top-down approach after mission functions are identified (i.e., does not include mission thread analysis).
2.  Approach begins at a higher level than other approaches examined (i.e., includes mission thread analysis) and 
includes lower level analysis.
3. Suggests using MBSE, but not required and often not considered.
4. Would require pairing with additional modeling and simulation plugin.
5.  RMF is intended to be a top-down approach but is often applied bottom-up using security control compliance  
based on system type.
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a relatively simple architectural analysis approach to assist in the development of safe, 
secure, and resilient military systems. Specifically, the authors are executing a detailed 
case study for a next-generation aircraft refueling system. This case study focuses on 
understanding the utility of the STPA-Sec approach for eliciting cybersecurity and resil-
iency requirements when developing complex military systems (i.e., unprecedented cyber- 
physical systems of systems). Ultimately, continued research in this field will enable more 
effective and efficient cybersecurity architectural analysis for complex systems regardless 
of the application domain.  
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